Next Gen to This Gen
Scaling Material Innovations
in Fashion

Read across the magic wand responses and a striking pattern emerges. The most frequent asks are not about materials science, pilot programmes, or communication tools. They are about incentive structures, accounting frameworks, business model architecture, and pricing mechanisms:

• “Change the single margin KPI to a dual KPI: margin plus planetary impact” (Brand, 2026)
• “Shift procurement from price per metre to lifecycle value” (Innovator, 2026)
• “Price the damages of CO₂ and chemicals throughout the industry” (Innovator, 2026)
• “Flip the cost of virgin versus recycled/bio-feedstocks” (Brand, 2024)
• “Make true pricing a legal standard” (Supporter, 2024)
• “AI-powered P&L tools predicting the financial impact of material adoption” (Brand, 2026)
• “Volume aggregation across brands to minimise the price premium” (Brand, 2026)
• “Sticks and carrots to reduce the cost difference between sustainable and conventional materials” (Investor, 2024)

This is a profound signal. The industry is not saying it lacks knowledge, passion, or pioneering companies. It is saying that the economic system in which it operates makes the right choice the expensive choice. Conventional materials do not price in their environmental cost. Brand KPIs reward margin, not impact. Procurement systems evaluate cost per unit, not cost per lifecycle. Finance teams have no tools to model the full P&L of a material switch.

The implication is uncomfortable: no amount of innovation, awareness, or goodwill can overcome a broken incentive structure. Innovators building better materials are competing against a price signal that systematically undervalues what they offer. Brands wanting to adopt face internal financial frameworks that make the switch look like a cost, not an investment. This is why the same asks appear year after year. It is not that the industry ignores the feedback. It is that the levers required to act on it (carbon pricing, mandatory LCA-based procurement, EPR reform, true cost accounting) sit largely outside the control of any individual company.

The strategic implication for innovators: until the external incentive structure changes, the most durable competitive advantage is not a better material. It is a commercial model that makes the switch financially compelling within the current broken system. That means being able to show cost-to-parity roadmaps, offer conditional offtake structures with clear off-ramps, and build the P&L case that finance teams cannot reject. The companies that will scale are not those waiting for the system to fix itself.

The Next Gen to This Gen comparative survey is the first longitudinal tracking study of its kind in the fashion materials innovation sector. By replicating the 2024 survey methodology exactly in 2026, we are able to track genuine shifts in confidence, commercial progress, and strategic priorities across the same five stakeholder groups, rather than comparing different populations.

Both survey rounds were conducted in partnership with innovators, brands, suppliers, investors, and supporters who shared their real commercial experience, including failures and setbacks, not just success stories. The open-ended responses are some of the most valuable data in the study, and we have quoted them with the permission of respondents.

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1. This is not a panel study. The 2024 and 2026 respondents are not the same people. We have no data on what proportion participated in both rounds. Year-on-year changes reflect shifts in the survey population as well as shifts in the ecosystem. A change from 85% to 75% on any question could reflect genuine behaviour change, a different mix of respondents, or both. All year-on-year comparisons should be interpreted as directional signals, not precise measurements of change within a fixed cohort.

2. The sample is purposive, not random. Respondents are drawn from Sustainabelle’s professional network and the engaged materials innovation community. This population is more sustainability-aware, more innovation-engaged, and more optimistic about materials innovation than the average fashion industry practitioner. The data almost certainly understates how difficult adoption is in the broader industry. If even the most engaged practitioners are struggling with the barriers described here, the average brand or supplier is likely further behind.

3. Small sub-group samples carry wide margins of error. For the Supplier (n=13) and Investor (n=13) groups, a single respondent changing their answer moves a percentage by approximately 7.7 points. The approximate 95% confidence interval for a proportion of 50% from n=13 is ±27 percentage points. This means many of the specific percentage figures shown for these groups are not statistically distinguishable from one another. The direction of movement is probably real; the precise figures are not reliable.

4. Sub-category innovator analysis should be treated as illustrative only. The startup type comparison (recycling vs bio-based fibres vs alternative leather vs dyes) is based on sub-samples of n=2 to 10 per category per year. A single company entering or leaving the survey can swing percentages by 10 to 50 points in these groups. The narrative direction is consistent with qualitative evidence; the specific numbers should not be cited as data.

5. Sustainability priorities are self-reported and subject to social desirability bias. Respondents may rate topics as “high priority” because they believe they should, rather than because their organisation’s budgets and decisions reflect that priority. The gap between stated sustainability priorities and actual purchasing behaviour is well-documented across industries. The declines shown in this data may partly reflect respondents becoming more honest about real priorities under commercial pressure, rather than genuine de-prioritisation across the board.

6. Geographic bias is significant. Over 80% of respondents are from Europe and North America. Major apparel-producing regions, including Bangladesh, Vietnam, China, Cambodia, India (outside of a few respondents), are essentially absent. The supplier and manufacturer perspective captured here is largely European, which is unrepresentative of global fashion supply chain realities. Brand perspectives are similarly Western-centric.

7. The 2026 edition lacks expert interview validation. The 2024 report was supplemented by 62 expert interviews which allowed the research team to test, deepen, and cross-check survey findings. The 2026 study is survey-only. Where quantitative findings are surprising or counter-intuitive, there is no interview data to validate or explain them.

8. Percentage deltas under 10 points are within the margin of error for most sub-groups. Given sample sizes, movements of 1 to 8 points in any direction for brand, supplier, or investor questions are not statistically significant. This report highlights large movements (≥10pts) as primary findings and treats smaller movements as directional. The chemical reduction finding (−1pt) is a clear case where the data does not support any strong conclusion.

Despite these limitations, this is likely the most comprehensive longitudinal dataset available on the materials innovation ecosystem in fashion, because no comparable study exists. Its value lies in:

• Large movements across multiple groups simultaneously. When innovators, brands, suppliers, investors, and supporters all point to the same bottlenecks from their different vantage points, that convergence is meaningful evidence even if individual numbers carry uncertainty. The supply chain integration finding (investors: 76%→100%; suppliers: 56%→67%) is robust precisely because it appears from multiple directions.
• The qualitative data. The open-ended responses are verbatim and unambiguous. 115 practitioners independently naming the same systemic barriers in 2026 that 159 named in 2024 is genuinely significant. No statistical test is needed to read that consistency.
• Extreme values. A finding of 0% (no brand rates signing offtakes as effective) or 100% (every investor rates supply chain integration as a significant barrier) is robust even from small samples. These floor and ceiling findings are real.
• The innovator data specifically. With n=56 (2024) and n=43 (2026) respondents who are predominantly Founders and C-Suite executives with direct knowledge of their company’s commercial situation, the innovator data is the most reliable in the study. Findings from this group, particularly on agreements, IP, and supplier partnerships, can be treated with reasonable confidence as directional indicators of the ecosystem.

The appropriate use of this data is as a practitioner intelligence product, not an academic study. It should inform strategic conversations, identify pressure points, and validate or challenge practitioner intuitions, not serve as the sole evidence base for regulatory or investment decisions.

The following is carried forward verbatim from the methodology section of the original 2024 Next Gen to This Gen report, for reference and continuity: